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Abstract
A new wave of growing antisemitism, driven by fringe Web
communities, is an increasingly worrying presence in the
socio-political realm. The ubiquitous and global nature of the
Web has provided tools used by these groups to spread their
ideology to the rest of the Internet. Although the study of an-
tisemitism and hate is not new, the scale and rate of change of
online data has impacted the efficacy of traditional approaches
to measure and understand this worrying trend.
In this paper, we present a large-scale, quantitative study of
online antisemitism. We collect hundreds of million comments
and images from alt-right Web communities like 4chan’s Po-
litically Incorrect board (/pol/) and the Twitter clone, Gab. Us-
ing scientifically grounded methods, we quantify the escalation
and spread of antisemitic memes and rhetoric across the Web.
We find the frequency of antisemitic content greatly increases
(in some cases more than doubling) after major political events
such as the 2016 US Presidential Election and the “Unite the
Right” rally in Charlottesville. Furthermore, this antisemitism
appears in tandem with sharp increases in white ethnic nation-
alist content on the same communities. We extract semantic
embeddings from our corpus of posts and demonstrate how au-
tomated techniques can discover and categorize the use of an-
tisemitic terminology. We additionally examine the prevalence
and spread of the antisemitic “Happy Merchant” meme, and in
particular how these fringe communities influence its propaga-
tion to more mainstream services like Twitter and Reddit.
Taken together, our results provide a data-driven, quanti-
tative framework for understanding online antisemitism. Our
open and scientifically grounded methods serve as a frame-
work to augment current qualitative efforts by anti-hate groups,
providing new insights into the growth and spread of anti-
semitism online.
1 Introduction
With the ubiquitous adoption of social media, online commu-
nities have played an increasingly important role in the real-
world. The news media is filled with reports of the sudden rise
in nationalistic politics coupled with racist ideology [101] gen-
erally attributed to the loosely defined group known as the alt-
right [98], a movement that can be characterized by the relative
youth of its adherents and relatively transparent racist ideol-
ogy [4]. The alt-right differs from older groups primarily in
its use of online communities to congregate, organize, and dis-
seminate information in weaponized form [69], often using hu-
mor and taking advantage of the scale and speed of communi-
cation the Web makes possible [40, 49, 112, 110, 111, 76, 109].
Recently, these fringe groups have begun to weaponize digi-
tal information on social media [112], in particular the use of
weaponized humor in the form of memes [111].
While the online activities of the alt-right are cause for con-
cern, this behavior is not limited to the Web: there has been
a recent spike in hate crimes in the United States [25], a gen-
eral proliferation of fascist and white power groups [95], and a
substantial increase in white nationalist propganda on college
campuses [8]. This worrying trend of real-world action mirror-
ing online rhetoric indicates the need for a better understanding
of online hate and its relationship to real-world events.
Antisemitism in particular is seemingly a core tenet of alt-
right ideology, and has been shown to be strongly related to
authoritarian tendencies not just in the US, but in many coun-
tries [34, 43]. Historical accounts concur with these findings:
antisemitic attitudes tend to be used by authoritarian ideologies
in general [2, 10]. Due to its pervasiveness, historical role in
the rise of ethnic and political authoritarianism, and the recent
resurgence of hate crimes, understanding online antisemitism
is of dire import. Although there are numerous anecdotal ac-
counts, we lack a clear, large-scale, quantitative measurement
and understanding of the scope of online semitism, and how it
spreads between Web communities.
The study of antisemitism and hate, as well as methods to
combat it are not new. Organizations like the Anti-Defamation
League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)
have spent decades attempting to address this societal problem.
However, these organizations have traditionally taken a qual-
itative approach, using surveys and a relatively small number
of subject matter experts to manually examine content deemed
hateful. While these techniques have produced many valuable
insights, qualitative approaches are extremely limited consid-
ering the ubiquity and scale of the Web. Simply put, the sheer
volume and rapidly evolving nature of online antisemitism
calls for an open, data-driven approach. Indeed, this limitation
is starting to be recognized by these organizations: in a recent
report, the ADL used mixed qualitative and data-driven meth-
ods to argue that aproximately 4.2 million antisemitic posts
appeared in Twitter in 2017 [7].
While laudable, these efforts are limited and are in large part
anathema to the scientific process. For example, the ADL’s re-
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cent report used “expert review” to develop a hard coded list of
antisemitic terminology and context-terms to construct a “pro-
prietary boolean algorithm” to measure antisemitism on Twit-
ter. While the ADL report certainly provides some quantifica-
tion of online antisemitism, the fact that both their data (the
ADL asked us to sign an NDA to acquire their data set) and
methodology are closed places limits on the use of these find-
ings for the scientific community. With that said, work by the
ADL [5] and SPLC [96] comprise, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the largest data-driven attempts by anti-hate groups to
report on the subject.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We present an
open, scientifically rigorous framework for quantitative anal-
ysis of online antisemitism. Our methodology is transpar-
ent, and our data will be made available upon request. Using
this approach, we characterize the rise of online antisemitism
across several axes.
More specifically we answer the following research ques-
tions:
• RQ1: Has there been a rise in online antisemitism, and if
so, what is the trend?
• RQ2: How is online antisemitism expressed, and how can
we automatically discover and categorize newly emerging
antisemitic language?
• RQ3: How are memes being weaponized to produce eas-
ily digestible and shareable antisemitic ideology?
• RQ4: To what degree are fringe communities influenc-
ing the rest of the Web in terms of spreading antisemitic
propaganda?
We answer these questions by analyzing a dataset of over
100 million posts from two fringe Web communities: 4chan’s
Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and Gab1. We train word2vec
models [71], which incorporate continuous bag of words mod-
els, using the posts on these Web communities to gain an un-
derstanding, and discovery of new antisemitic terms.
Our analysis reveals thematic communities of derogatory
slang words, nationalistic slurs, and religious hatred toward
Jews. We analyze almost seven million images using an im-
age processing pipeline we previously developed [111] to
quantify the prevalence and diversity of the notoriously an-
tisemitic Happy Merchant meme [58] (see Fig. 1). We find
that the Happy Merchant enjoys substantial popularity in both
communities, and its usage overlaps with other general pur-
pose (i.e. not intrinsically antisemitic) memes. Finally, we use
Hawkes Processes [47] to model the relative influence of sev-
eral fringe and mainstream communities with respect to dis-
semination of the Happy Merchant meme.
Disclaimer. Note that content posted on both Web communi-
ties can be characterized as highly offensive and racist. In the
rest of the paper, we present our analysis without censoring any
offensive language, hence we inform the reader that the rest of
the paper contains language that is likely to be upsetting.
1https://gab.ai/
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Some examples of the racist and antisemitic Happy Mer-
chant Meme.
2 Related Work
In this section, we present previous related work that focus
on understanding hate speech on various Web communities,
detecting hate speech, and understanding antisemitism on the
Web.
Hate Speech on Web Communities. Several studies focus on
understanding the degree of hate speech that exists in vari-
ous Web communities. Specifically, Hine et al. [49] focus on
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) by analyzing 8M
posts during the course of two and a half months. Using the
Hatebase database they find that 12% of the posts are hateful,
hence highlighting /pol/’s high degree of hate speech. Simi-
larly, Zannettou et al. [110] undertake a similar analysis on
Gab finding that Gab exhibits two times less the hate speech
of /pol/, whereas when compared to Twitter it has two times
more hateful posts. Silva et al. [93] use the Hatebase database
to study hate speech on two Web communities, namely Twit-
ter and Whisper. Their quantitative analysis sheds light on the
targets (recipients) of hate speech on the two Web communi-
ties. Similarly, Mondal et al. [72] use the same Web communi-
ties to understand the prevalence of hate speech, the effects of
anonymity, as well as identify the forms of hate speech in each
community.
Hate Speech Detection.A substantial body of prior work fo-
cus on the detection of hate speech on Web communities.
Specifically, Warner and Hirschberg [105] use decision lists
in conjunction with an SVM classifier to detect hateful con-
tent. They evaluate the proposed approach on a classification
pilot that aim to distinguish antisemitic content, highlighting
that their approach has acceptable accuracy (94%), whereas
precision and recall are mediocre (68% and 60%, resp.) Kwok
and Wang [62] use a Naive Bayes classifier on tweets to clas-
sify them as either racist against blacks or non-racist. Their
classifier achieves an accuracy of 76%, hence highlighting the
challenges in discerning racist content using machine learn-
ing. Djuric et al. [33] leverage a continuous bag of words
(CBOW) model within doc2vec embeddings to generate low-
dimensional text representations from comments posted on the
Yahoo finance website. These representations are then fed to
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a binary classifier that classifies comments as hateful or not;
they find that the proposed model outperforms BOW baselines
models.
Gitari et al. [46] use subjectivity and sentiment metrics to
build a hate lexicon that is subsequently used in a classi-
fier that determines whether content is hateful. Waseem and
Hovy [106] annotate 16K tweets as racist, sexist or neither.
They also assess which features of tweets contribute more on
the detection task, finding that character n-grams along with
a gender feature provide the best performance. Del Vigna et
al. [104] propose the use of Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) for the detection of
hateful Italian comments on Facebook, while Ross et al. [86]
provide a German hate speech corpus for the refugee crisis.
Serra et al. [89] use the error signal of class-based language
models as a feature to a neural classifier, hence allowing to
capture online behavior that uses new or misspelled words.
This approach help outperform other baselines on hate speech
detection by 4% 11%. Founta et al. [41] propose the use of
a unified deep learning model for the classification of tweets
into different forms of hate speech like hate, sexism, bullying,
and sarcasm. The proposed model is able to perform inference
on the aforementioned facets of abusive content without fine
tuning, while at the same time it outperforms state-of-the-art
models.
Saleem et al. [87] approach the problem through the lens of
multiple Web communities by proposing a community-driven
model for hate speech detection. Their evaluation on Reddit,
Voat, and Web forums data highlight that their model can be
trained on one community and applied on another, while out-
performing keyword-based approaches. Davidson et al. [31]
leverage the Hatebase database and crowdsourcing to annotate
tweets that may contain hateful or offensive language. Using
this dataset, they built a detection model using Logistic Re-
gression. Their analysis highlights that racist and homophobic
tweets are likely to be classified as hate speech, while sexist
tweets are usually classified as offensive.
Burnap and Williams [24] propose a set of classification
tools that aim to assess hateful content with respect to race,
sexuality, and disability, while at the same time proposing a
blended model that classifies hateful content that may contain
multiple classes (e.g., race and sexuality). Badjatiya et al. [11]
compare a wide variety of machine and deep learning models
for the task of detecting hate speech. They conclude that the
use of deep learning models provide a substantial performance
boost when compared with character and words n-grams.
Gao et al.[45] propose the use of a semi-supervised ap-
proach for the detection of implicit and explicit hate speech,
which mitigate costs of the annotation process and possible bi-
ases. Also, their analysis on tweets posted around the US elec-
tions highlights the prevalence of hate on posts about the elec-
tions and the partisan nature of these posts. In their subsequent
work, Gao and Huang [44] aim to tackle the hate speech detec-
tion by introducing context information on the classification
process. Their experimental setup on news articles’ comments
highlights that the introduction of context information on Lo-
gistic Regression and neural networks provides a performance
boost between 3% and 7% in terms of F1 score.
Elsherief et al. [37] perform a personality analysis on insti-
gators and recipients of hate speech on Twitter. They conclude
that both groups comprises eccentric individuals, and that in-
stigators mainly target popular users with (possibly) a goal
to get more visibility within the platform. In their subsequent
work, Elsherief et al. [36] perform a linguistic-driven analysis
of hate speech on social media. Specifically, they differentiate
hate speech in targeted hate (e.g., towards a specific individual)
and generalized (e.g., towards a specific race) and find that tar-
geted hate is angrier and more informal while generalized hate
is mainly about religion.
Finally, Olteanu et al. [80] propose the use of user-centered
metrics (e.g., users’ overall perception of classification quality)
for the evaluation of hate speech detection systems.
Case Studies. Magu et al. [68] undertake a case study on Op-
eration Google, a movement that aimed to use benign words in
hateful contexts to trick Google’s automated systems. Specif-
ically, they build a model that is able to detect posts that use
benign words in hateful contexts and undertake an analysis on
the set of Twitter users that were involved in Operation Google.
Smedt et al. [94] focus on Jihadist hate speech by proposing a
hate detection model using Natural Language Processing and
Machine Learning techniques. Furthermore, they undertake a
quantitative and qualitative analysis on a corpus of 45K tweets
and examine the users involved in Jihadist hate speech.
Antisemitism. Leets [63] surveys 120 Jews or homosexual stu-
dents to assess their perceived consequences of hate speech, to
understand the motive behind hate messages, and if the recip-
ients will respond or seek support after the hate attack. The
main findings is that motives are usually enduring, that recipi-
ents respond in a passively manner while they often seek sup-
port after hate attacks. Shainkman et al. [90] use the outcomes
of two surveys from EU and ADL to assess how the level of
antisemitism relates to the perception of antisemitism by the
Jewish community in eight different EU countries. Alietti et
al. [3] undertake phone surveys of 1.5K Italians on islamopho-
bic and antisemitic attitudes finding that there is an overlap of
ideology for both types of hate speech. Also, they investigate
the use of three indicators (anomie, ethnocentrism, and author-
itarianism) as predictors for Islamophobia and antisemitism.
Ben-Moshe et al. [15] uses focus groups to explore the im-
pact of antisemitic behavior to Jewish children. They conclude
that there is a need for more education in matters related to
racism, discrimination, and antisemitism. Bilewicz et al. [18]
make two studies on antisemitism in Poland finding that Jew-
ish conspiracy is the most popular and older antisemitic belief.
Furthermore, they report the personality and identity traits that
are more related to antisemitic behavior.
Remarks. In contrast with the aforementioned work, we fo-
cus on studying the dissemination of antisemitic content on
the Web by undertaking a large-scale quantitative analysis.
Our study focuses on two fringe Web communities; /pol/ and
Gab, where we study the dissemination of racial slurs and an-
tisemitic memes.
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/pol/ Gab
Term #posts (%) Rank RatioIncrease #posts (%) Rank
Ratio
Increase
“jew” 1,993,432 (3.0%) 13 1.64 763,329 (2.0%) 19 16.44
“kike” 562.983 (0.8%) 147 2.67 86,395 (0.2%) 628 61.20
“white” 2,883,882 (4.3%) 3 1.25 1,336,756 (3.8%) 9 15.92
“black” 1,320,213 (1.9%) 22 0.89 600,000 (1.6%) 49 7.20
“nigger” 1,763,762 (2.6%) 16 1.28 133,987 (0.4%) 258 36.88
Total 67,416,903(100%) - 0.95 35,528,320(100%) - 8.14
Table 1: Number of posts, and their respective percentage in the
dataset, for the terms“jew,” “kike,” “white,” “black,” and “nigger.” We
also report the rank of each term for each dataset (i.e., popularity in
terms of count of appearance) and the ratio of increase between the
start and the end of our datasets.
(a) /pol/
(b) Gab
Figure 2: Use of ethnic racial terms and slurs over time on /pol/ and
Gab. Note that the figure is best viewed in color.
3 Results
In this section, we present our temporal analysis that shows
the use of racial slurs over time on Gab and /pol/, our text-
based analysis that leverages word2vec embeddings [71] to
understand the use of text with respect to ethnic slurs, and our
memetic analysis that focuses on the propagation of the anti-
semitic Happy Merchant meme. Finally, we present our influ-
ence estimation findings that shed light on the influence that
Web communities have on each other when considering the
dissemination of antisemitic memes.
Temporal Analysis. Anecdotal evidence reports escalating
racial and ethnic hate propaganda on fringe Web communi-
ties [102]. To examine this, we study the prevalence of some
terms related to ethnic slurs on /pol/ and Gab, and how they
evolve over time. We focus on five specific terms: “jew,”
“kike,” “white,” “black,” and “nigger.” We limit our scope to
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Figure 3: Percentage of daily posts per day for the terms “jew” and
“white” on /pol/. We also report the detected changepoints (see Ta-
bles 2 and 3, respectively, for the meaning of each changepoint).
these because while they are notorious for ethnic hate for many
groups, these specific words ranked among the the most fre-
quently used ethnic terms on both communities. Table 1 re-
ports the overall number of posts that contain these terms in
both Web communities, their rank in terms of raw number of
appearances in our dataset, as well as the increase in the use
of these terms between the beginning and end of our datasets.
Also, Fig. 2 plots the use of these terms over time, binned
by day, and averaged over a rolling window to smooth out
small-scale fluctuations. We observe that terms like “white”
and “jew” are extremely popular in both Web communities;
3rd and 13th respectively in /pol/, while in Gab they rank as
the 9th and 19th most popular words, respectively. We see a
similar level of popularity for ethnic racial slurs like “nigger”
and “kike,” especially on /pol/; they are the 16th and 147th
most popular words in terms of raw counts. Note that /pol/ has
a vocabulary 1.5x times larger than that of Gab (see Text Anal-
ysis below). These findings highlight that both /pol/ and Gab
users habitually and increasingly engage in discussions about
ethnicity and use targeted hate speech.
We also find an increasing trend in the use of most ethnic
terms; the number of posts containing each of the terms ex-
cept “black” increases, even when normalized for the increas-
ing number of posts on the network overall.
Interestingly, among the terms we examine, we observe that
the term “kike” shows the greatest increase in use for both
/pol/ and Gab, followed by “jew” on /pol/ and “nigger” on
Gab. Also, it is worth noting that ethnic terms on Gab have
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Rank Date Events
1 2016-12-25
2016-12-23: Samantha Power, US ambassador to the UN abstains from voting in a
140 Security Council vote to condemn Israel’s construction of settlements into the Palestinian territories [75].
2016-12-19: ISIS truck attack in Berlin Germany [82].
2 2017-01-17
2017-01-17: Presidential inauguration of Donald Trump [30].
2017-01-17: Benjamin Netanyahu attacks the latest peace-conference by calling it “useless” [22].
3 2017-04-02
2017-04-05: President Trump removes Steve Bannon from his position on the National Security Council [29].
2017-04-06: President Trump orders a strike on the Shayrat Air Base in Homs, Syria, using 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles [48].
4 2017-11-26 2017-11-29: According to a New York Times report, it is revealed that Jared Kushner has been interviewed by Robert Mueller’s team in November [9].
5 2016-10-08
2016-10-09: Second presidential debate [83].
2016-10-09: A shooting takes place in Jerusalem that kills a police officeser and two innocent people, wounding several others [14].
6 2016-11-20 2016-11-19: Swastikas, Trump Graffiti appear in Beastie Boys Adam Yauch Memorial Park in Brooklyn [26].
7 2017-05-16
2017-05-16: President Donald Trump admits that he shared classified information with Russian envoys,
this contradicts previous denials by the president [81].
2017-05-16: U.S. intelligence warns Israel to withold intelligence information from President Trump,
due to fears that it coule fall into Russian hands, and ultimately to Iran [74].
8 2017-07-02
2017-06-25: The Supreme Court reinstates President Trump’s travel ban [108].
2017-06-29: President Trump’s partial travel ban comes into effect [13].
Table 2: Dates that significant changepoint were detected in posts that contain the term “jew” on /pol/. We sort them according to their
“significance” (see Section 5) and we report corresponding real-world events that happened one week before/after of the changepoint date.
Rank Date Events
1
3
2017-06-10
2017-06-11
2017-06-08: During hearings in the Senate Intelligence Committee, Former Director of the FBI James Comey
testifies about his conversations with President Trump regarding whether Trump pressured
him to end investigations into Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor [100].
2017-06-12: A federal court rejects Trump’s appeal to stop the injunction against his travel ban [65].
2017-06-13: The Senate Intelligence Committee interviews Attorney General Jeff Sessions on occurences
regarding potential Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election [79].
2017-06-15: President Trump, via Twitter post, admits he is officially under investigationg for obstruction of justice,
and restates his claim that this is a ’witch hunt’ [92].
2 2017-01-24
2017-01-17: Presidential inauguration of Donald Trump [30].
2017-01-23: Women’s March protest [84].
2017-01-25: President Trump formalliy issues executive order for construction of a wall on the United States - Mexico border [50].
4 2016-12-25 2016-12-19: ISIS truck attack in Berlin Germany [82].
5 2017-01-14 2017-01-17: Presidential inauguration of Donald Trump [30].
6 2017-08-12
2017-08-12: The “Unite the Right” rally takes place in Charlottesville, Virginia [97].
2017-08-13: President Trump, in a press briefing, condemns the violence from “many sides” at a far-right
rally at Charlottesville, Virginia [64].
7 2017-08-21 2017-08-17: Steve Bannon resigns as Chief Strategist for the White House [32].
8 2016-07-13
2016-07-08: Fatal shooting of 5 police officers in Dallas by Micha Xavier Johnson [35].
2016-07-14: Truck attack in Nice, France [12].
2016-07-16: The 2016 Republican National Convention [28].
9 2016-10-08 2016-10-09: Second presidential debate [83].
10 2016-11-10 2016-11-08: Presidential election of Donald Trump [27].
Table 3: Dates that significant changepoint were detected in posts that contain the term “white” on /pol/. We sort them according to their
“significance” (see Section 5) and we report corresponding real-world events that happened one week before/after of the changepoint date.
a greater increase in the rate of use when compared to /pol/ (cf.
ratio of increase for /pol/ and Gab in Table 1). Furthermore,
by looking at Fig. 2 we find that by the end of our datasets,
the term “jew” appears in 4.0% of /pol/ daily posts and 3.1%
of the Gab posts, while the term “nigger” appears in 3.4% and
0.6% of the daily posts on /pol/ and Gab, respectively. The lat-
ter is particularly worrisome for anti-black hate, as by the end
of our datasets the term “nigger” on /pol/ overtakes the term
“black” (3.4% vs 1.9% of all the daily posts). Taken together,
these findings highlight that most of these terms are increas-
ingly popular within these fringe Web communities, hence em-
phasizing the need to study the use of ethnic identity terms over
time.
We note major fluctuations in the the use of ethnic terms
over time, and one reasonable assumption is that these fluctu-
ations happen due to real-world events. To analyze the valid-
ity of this assumption, we use changepoint analysis (See Sec-
tion 5), which provides us with ranked changes in the mean
and variance of time series behavior. In /pol/, our analysis re-
veals several changepoints with temporal proximity to real-
world political events for the use of both “jew” (see Fig. 3(a)
and Table 2) and “white” (see Fig. 3(b) and Table 3). For usage
in the term “jew,” major world events in Israel and the Middle
East correspond to several changepoints, including the 2016
UN abstention from condemning continued Israeli settlement,
the U.S. missile attack against Syrian airbases in 2017, and
terror attacks in Jerusalem. Events involving Donald Trump,
including Jared Kushner’s interview by Robert Mueller, the
resignation of Steve Bannon from the National Security Coun-
cil, the 2017 “travel ban” (i.e., Executive Order 13769), and
the presidential inauguration occur within proximity to sev-
eral notable changepoints for usage of “jew” as well. For us-
age of “white,” we find that changepoints correspond closely
to events related to Donald Trump, including the election, in-
auguration, presidential debates, as well as major revelations
in the ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the
presidential election. Additionally, several changepoints in the
use of “white” correspond to major terror attacks by ISIS in
Europe, including vehicle attacks in Berlin and Nice, as well
as news related to the 2017 “travel ban” (i.e., Executive Order
13769). In the case of “white,” the relationship between on-
line usage and real-world behavior is perhaps best illustrated
by the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally, which marks
the global maximum in our dataset for the use of the term on
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/pol/ Gab
Word CosineSimilarity Word Probability Word
Cosine
Similarity Word Probability
(((jew))) 0.802 ashkenazi 0.269 jewish 0.807 jew 0.770
jewish 0.797 jew 0.196 kike 0.777 jewish 0.089
kike 0.776 jewish 0.143 gentil 0.776 gentil 0.044
zionist 0.723 outjew 0.077 goyim 0.756 shabbo 0.014
goyim 0.701 sephard 0.071 zionist 0.735 ashkenazi 0.013
gentil 0.696 gentil 0.026 juden 0.714 goyim 0.005
jewri 0.683 zionist 0.025 (((jew))) 0.695 kike 0.005
zionism 0.681 hasid 0.024 khazar 0.688 zionist 0.005
juden 0.665 talmud 0.010 jewri 0.681 rabbi 0.004
heeb 0.663 mizrahi 0.006 yid 0.679 talmud 0.003
Table 4: Top ten similar words to the term “jew” and their respec-
tive cosine similarity. We also report the top ten words generated by
providing as a context term the word “jew” and their respective prob-
abilities on /pol/ and Gab.
both /pol/ and Gab ( see Fig. 2). For Gab, we find that change-
points in these time series reflect similar kinds of news events
to those in /pol/, both for “jew” (see Fig. 13(a)) and “white”
(see Fig. 13(b)). Several changepoints overlap on world event
such as the election, the inauguration, and the Charlottesville
rally (see Table 7 and Table 8). These findings provide evi-
dence that discussion of ethnic identity on fringe Web commu-
nities increases with political events and real-world extremist
actions. The implications of this relationship are worrying, as
others have shown that ethnic hate expressed on social media
influences real-life hate crimes [78, 77].
Text Analysis. We hypothesize that ethnic terms (e.g., “jew”
and “white”) are strongly linked to antisemitic and white
supremacist sentiments To test this, we use word2vec, a two-
layer neural network that generate word representations as
embedded vectors [71]. Specifically, a word2vec model takes
as an input a large corpus of text and generates a multi-
dimensional vector space where each word is mapped to a vec-
tor in the space (also called an embedding). The vectors are
generated in such way that words that share similar contexts
tend to have nearly parallel vectors in the multi-dimensional
vector space. Given a context (list of words appearing in a sin-
gle block of text), a trained word2vec model also gives the
probability that each other word will appear in that context. By
analyzing both these probabilities and the word vectors them-
selves, we are able to map the usage of various terms in our
corpus.
We train two word2vec models; one for the /pol/ dataset
and one for the Gab dataset. First, as a pre-processing step,
we remove stop words (such as “and,” “like,” etc.) and punc-
tuation from each post. We also perform stemming for the
words in each post. Then, using the words of each post we
train our word2vec models with a context window equal to 7
(defines the maximum distance between the current and the
predicted words during the generation of the word vectors).
Also, we consider only words that appear at least 500 times in
each corpus, hence creating a vocabulary of 31,337 and 20,115
stemmed words for /pol/ and Gab, respectively. Next, we use
the generated word embeddings to gain a deeper understanding
of the context in which certain terms are used. We measure the
“closeness” of two terms (i and j) by generating their vectors
from the word2vec models (hi and hj) and calculating their co-
sine similarity (cos θ(h1, h2)). Furthermore, we use the trained
word2vec models to predict a set of candidate words that are
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Cosine distance
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
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/pol/
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Figure 4: CDF of the cosine distances for all the pairs of words in the
trained word2vec models.
likely to appear in the context of a given term.
We first look at the term “jew.” Table 4 reports the top ten
most similar words to the term “jew” along with their cosine
similarity, as well as the top ten candidate words and their
respective probability. By looking to the most similar words,
we observe that on /pol/ “(((jew)))” is the most similar term
(cos θ = 0.80), while on Gab is the 7th most similar term
(cos θ = 0.69). The triple parentheses is a widely used, anti-
semitic construction that calls attention to supposed secret Jew-
ish involvement and conspiracy [88]. Slurs like “kike,” which
is historically associated with general ethnic disgust, rank sim-
ilarly (cos θ = 0.77 on both /pol/ and Gab). This suggests that
on both Web communities, the term “jew” itself is closely re-
lated to classical antisemitic contexts. When digging deeper,
we note that “goyim” is the 5th and 4th most similar term to
“jew,” in /pol/ and Gab, respectively. “Goyim” is the plural
of “goy,” and while its original meaning is just “non-jews,”
modern usage tends to have a derogatory nature [107]. On
fringe Web communities it is used to emphasize the “struggle”
against Jewish conspiracy by preemptively assigning Jewish
hostility to non-Jews as in “The Goyim Know” meme [61]. It
is also commonly used in a dismissive manner toward commu-
nity members; a typical attacker will accuse a user he disagrees
with of being a “good goy,” [57] a meme implying obedience
to a supposed Jewish elite conspiracy. When looking at the set
of candidate words, given the term “jew,” we find the candidate
word “ashkenazi” (most likely on /pol/ and 5th most likely on
Gab), which refers to a specific subset of the Jewish commu-
nity. Interestingly, we note that the term “jew” exists in the set
of most likely words (among the top two for both communi-
ties) indicating that /pol/ and Gab users abuse the term “jew”
by posting messages that include the term “jew” multiple times
in the same sentence. We also note that this has a higher prob-
ability of happening on Gab rather than /pol/ (cf. probabilities
for candidate word “jew” in Table 4).
To better show the connections between words similar to
“jew,” Fig. 5 demonstrates the words associated with “jew”
on /pol/ as a graph2, where nodes are words obtained from
the word2vec model, and the edges are weighted by the co-
sine distances between the words (obtained from the trained
word2vec models). Note that the cosine distance is the addi-
tive inverse of the cosine similarity between two words, and
we use it to demonstrate the distance between nodes in our
graph. The graph visualizes the two-hop ego network [1] from
2We show the same graph for Gab on Fig. 11 in Appendix A.
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Figure 5: Graph representation of the words associated with “jew” on /pol/. We extract the graph by finding the most similar words ( cutoff at
0.4 cosine distance value), and then we take the 2-hop ego network around “jew. In this graph the size of a node is proportional to its degree
(i.e., the number of other nodes it is directly connected to); the color of a node is based on the community it is a member of; and the entire graph
is visualized using a layout algorithm that takes edge weights into account (i.e., nodes with similar words will be closer in the visualization).
Note that the figure is best viewed in color.
the word “jew,” which includes all the nodes that are either
directly connected or connected through an intermediate node
to the “jew” node. We consider two nodes to be connected if
their corresponding word vectors have a cosine distance that is
less or equal to a pre-defined threshold. To select this thresh-
old, we plot the CDF of the cosine distances between all the
pair of words that exist in the trained word2vec models (see
Fig. 4). Note that since we plot the cosine distances for all
possible pairs of words, there is a large number of cosine dis-
tances; to select only the most important ones we should se-
lect a very small percentage. Therefore, we elect to set this
threshold to 0.4, which corresponds to keeping only 0.2% of all
possible connections (cosine distances). To identify the struc-
ture and communities in our graph, we run the community
detection heuristic presented in [19], and we paint each com-
munity with a different color. Finally, the graph is layed out
with the ForceAtlas2 algorithm [52], which takes into account
the weight of the edges when laying out the nodes in the 2-
dimensional space.
This visualization reveals the existence of historically
salient antisemitic terms, as well as newly invented slurs, as
the most prominent associations to the word “jew.” We also
note communities forming distinct themes. Keeping in mind
that proximity in the visualization implies contextual simi-
larity, we note two close, but distinct communities of words
which portray Jews as a morally corrupt ethnicity on the one
hand (green nodes), and as powerful geopolitical conspirators
on the other (blue). Notably the blue community connects ca-
nards of Jewish political power to anti-Israel and anti-Zionist
slurs. The three, more distant communities document /pol/’s
interest in three topics: The obscure details of ethnic Jewish
identity (grey), Kabbalistic and cryptic Jewish lore (orange),
and religious, or theological topics (pink).
We next examine the use of the term “white.” We hypoth-
esize that this term is closely tied to ethnic nationalism. To
provide insight for how “white” is used on /pol/ and Gab, we
use the same analysis as described above for the term “jew.”
Table 5 shows the top ten similar words to “white” and the
top ten most likely words to appear in the context of “white.”
When looking at the most similar terms, we note the existence
of “huwhite” (cos θ = 0.78 on /pol/ and cos θ = 0.70 on Gab),
a pronunciation of “white” popularized by the YouTube videos
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/pol/ Gab
Word CosineSimilarity Word Probability Word
Cosine
Similarity Word Probability
huwhit 0.789 supremacist 0.494 black 0.713 supremacist 0.827
black 0.771 supremaci 0.452 huwhit 0.703 supremaci 0.147
(((white))) 0.754 supremist 0.008 nonwhit 0.684 genocid 0.009
nonwhit 0.747 male 0.003 poc 0.669 helmet 0.004
huwit 0.655 race 0.002 caucasian 0.641 nationalist 0.003
hwite 0.655 supremecist 0.002 whitepeopl 0.625 hous 0.003
whiteeuropean 0.644 nationalist 0.002 dispossess 0.624 privileg < 0.001
hispan 0.631 genocid 0.002 indigen 0.602 male < 0.001
asian 0.628 non 0.001 negroid 0.599 knight < 0.001
brownblack 0.627 guilt 0.001 racial 0.595 non < 0.001
Table 5: Top ten similar words to the term “white” and their respec-
tive cosine similarity. We also report the top ten words generated by
providing as a context term the word “white” and their respective
probabilities on /pol/ and Gab.
of white supremacist, Jared Taylor [103]. “Huwhite” is a par-
ticularly interesting example of how the alt-right adopts certain
language, even language that is seemingly derogatory towards
themselves, in an effort to further their ideological goals. We
also note the existence of other terms referring to ethnicity,
such the terms “black” (cos θ = 0.77 on /pol/ and cos θ = 0.71
on Gab), “whiteeuropean” (cos θ = 0.64 on /pol/), and “cau-
casian” (cos θ = 0.64 on Gab). Interestingly, we again note the
presence of the triple parenthesis “(((white)))” term on /pol/
(cos θ = 0.75), which refers to Jews who conspire to disguise
themselves as white.
When looking at the most likely candidate words, we find
that on /pol/ the term “white” is linked with “supremacist,”
“supremacy,” and other ethnic nationalism terms. The same ap-
plies on Gab with greater intensity as the word “supremacist”
has a substantially larger probability of occurring compared to
the probability obtained by the /pol/ model. To provide more
insight into the contexts and use of “white” on /pol/ we show its
most similar terms and their nearest associations in Fig. 6 (us-
ing the same approach as for “jew” in Fig. 5)3. We find seven
different communities that evidence identity politics alongside
themes of racial purity, miscegenation, and political correct-
ness. These communities correspond to distinct ethnic and gen-
der themes, like Hispanics (green), Blacks (orange), Asians
(teal), and women (pink). The central community (grey) dis-
plays terms relating to whiteness with notable themes of eth-
nic nationalism. The final two communities relate to concerns
about race-mixing (turquoise) and a prominent pink cluster
that intriguingly, references terms related to left-wing political
correctness [23], such as microagression and privilege (violet).
Meme Analysis. In addition to hateful terms, memes also play
a well documented role in the spread of propaganda and ethnic
hate in Web communities [111]. To detail how memes spread
and how different Web communities influence one another
with memes, our previous research [111] established a pipeline
which automatically collects, annotates, and analyzes over
160M memes from over 2.6B posts from from Web commu-
nities; Reddit, /pol/, Gab, and Twitter. Within Reddit, we pay
particular attention to The Donald subreddit (The Donald),
a Trump supporting subreddit which notoriously propagates
hateful memes [111] and propaganda [42]. In a nutshell, we
use perceptual hashing [73] and clustering techniques [39] to
track and analyze the propagation of memes across multiple
3We show the same graph for Gab on Fig. 12 in Appendix A.
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Figure 6: Graph representation of the words associated with “white”
on /pol/. We generate the graph using the same procedure as Fig. 5.
Note that the figure is best viewed in color.
Web communities. To achieve this, we rely on images obtained
from the Know Your Meme (KYM) site [54], which is a com-
prehensive encyclopedia of memes.
In this work, we use this pipeline to study how antisemitic
memes spread within and between these Web communities,
and examine which communities are the most influential in
their spread. To do this, we additionally examine two main-
stream Web communities, Twitter and Reddit, and compare
their influence (with respect to memes) with /pol/ and Gab.
Specifically, we focus on the Happy Merchant meme [58], il-
lustrated in Fig. 1, which is an especially important hate-meme
to study in this regard for several reasons. First, it represents an
unambiguous instance of antisemitic hate, and second, it is ex-
tremely popular and diverse in fringe Web communities like
/pol/ and Gab [111].
First, we aim to assess the popularity and increase of use
over time of the Happy Merchant meme on /pol/ and Gab.
Fig. 7 shows the number of posts that contain images with
the Happy Merchant meme for every day of our /pol/ and
Gab dataset.4 We further note that the numbers here repre-
sent a lower bound on the number of Happy Merchant post-
ings: our image processing pipeline is conservative and only
labels clusters that are unambiguously Happy Merchant; vari-
ations of other memes that incorporate the Happy Merchant are
harder to assess.We observe that /pol/ consistently shares anti-
semitic memes over time, whereas on Gab we note a substan-
tial and sudden increase in posts containing Happy Merchant
memes immediately after the Charlottesville rally. Our find-
ings on Gab dramatically illustrate the implication that real-
world eruptions of antisemitic behavior can catalyze the ac-
ceptability and popularity of antisemitic memes on other Web
communities.Taken together, these findings highlight that both
communities are exploited by users to disseminate racist con-
tent that is targeted towards the Jewish community.
Another important step in examining the Happy Merchant
meme is to explore how clusters of similar Happy Merchant
4We refer readers to the extended version of the original paper [111] for the
assessment of the pipeline’s performance.
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(a) /pol/
(b) Gab
Figure 7: Number of posts that contain images with the Happy Mer-
chant meme on /pol/ and Gab.
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Figure 8: Visualization of a subset of the obtained image clusters with
a particular focus on the penetration of the Happy Merchant meme to
other seemingly neutral memes. The figure is inspired from [111].
memes relate to other meme clusters in our dataset. One pos-
sibility is that Happy Merchants make-up a unique family of
memes, which would suggest that they segregate in form and
shape from other memes. Given that many memes evolve from
one another, a second possibility is that Happy Merchants “in-
fect” other common memes. This could serve, for instance, to
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Figure 10: Influence from source to destination community of Happy
Merchant and non-Happy-Merchant meme postings, normalized by
the number of events in the source community, while ∗ indicate sta-
tistical significance between the distributions with p < 0.01.
make antisemitism more accessible and common.
To this end, we visualize in Fig. 8 a subset of the meme clus-
ters, which we annotate using our KYM dataset, and a Happy
Merchant version of each meme. This visualization is inspired
from [111] and it demonstrates numerous instances of the
Happy Merchant infecting well-known and popular memes.
Some examples include Pepe the Frog [59], Roll Safe [60],
Bait this is Bait [55], and the Feels Good meme [56]. This sug-
gests that users generate antisemitic variants on recognizable
and popular memes.
Influence Estimation. While the growth and diversity of the
Happy Merchant within fringe Web communities is a cause
of significant concern, a critical question remains: How do
we chart the influence of Web communities on one another in
spreading the Happy Merchant? We have, until this point, ex-
amined the expanse of antisemitism on individual, fringe Web
communities. Memes however, develop with the purpose to
replicate and spread between different Web communities. To
examine the influence of meme spread between Web commu-
nities, we employ Hawkes processes (see Section 5) [66, 67],
which can be exploited to measure the predicted, reciprocal
influence that various Web communities have to each other.
We fit Hawkes models for all of our annotated clusters and
report the influence in two ways as in [111]. First, we re-
port the percentage of events expected to be attributable from
a source community to a destination community in Fig. 9. In
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other words, this shows the percentage of memes posted on one
community which, in the context of our model, are expected to
occur in direct response to posts in the source community. We
can thus interpret this percentage in terms of the relative in-
fluence of meme postings one network on another. We also re-
port influence in terms of efficacy by normalizing the influence
that each source community has, relative to the total number
of memes they post (Fig. 10). We compare the influence that
Web communities exert on one another for the Jewish-related
Happy Merchant memes (HM) and all other memes (OM) in
the graph. To assess the statistical significance of the results,
we perform two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests that com-
pare the distributions of influence from the Happy Merchant
and other memes; an asterisk within a cell denotes that the
distributions of influence between the source and destination
platform have statistically significant differences (p < 0.01).
Our results show that /pol/ is the single most influential
community for the spread of memes to all other Web com-
munities. Interestingly, the influence that /pol/ exhibits in the
spread of the Happy Merchant surpasses its influence in the
spread of other memes. However, although /pol/’s overall in-
fluence is higher on these networks, its per-meme efficacy for
the spread of antisemitic memes tended to be lower relative
to non-antisemitic memes with one intriguing exception of
The Donald. Another interesting feature we observe about this
trend is that memes on /pol/ itself show little influence from
other Web communities; both in terms of memes generally, and
non-antisemitic memes in particular. This suggests a unidirec-
tional meme flow and influence from /pol/ and furthermore,
suggest that /pol/ acts as a primary reservoir to incubate and
transmit antisemitism to downstream Web communities.
Main Take-Aways. To summarize, the main take-away points
from our quantitative assessment are:
1. Racial and ethnic slurs are increasing in popularity on
fringe Web communities. This trend is particularly no-
table for antisemitic language.
2. Our word2vec models in conjunction with graph visu-
alization techniques, demonstrate an explosion in diver-
sity of coded language for racial slurs used in /pol/ and
Gab. Our methods demonstrate a means to dissect this
language and decode racial discourse on fringe networks.
3. The use of ethnic and antisemitic terms on Web commu-
nities is substantially influenced by real-world events. For
instance, our analysis shows a substantial increase in the
use of ethnic slurs including the term “jew” around Don-
ald Trump’s Inauguration, while the same applies for the
term “white” and the Charlottesville rally.
4. When it comes to the use of antisemitic memes, we find
that /pol/ consistently shares the Happy Merchant Meme,
while for Gab we observe an increase in the use in 2017,
especially after the Charlottesville rally. Finally, our in-
fluence estimation analysis reveals that /pol/ is the most
influential actor in the overall spread of the Happy Mer-
chant Memes to other communities in our sample, possi-
bly due to the large volume of Happy merchant memes
that are shared within the platform. The Donald however,
is the most efficient actor in pushing Happy Merchant
memes to all the other sampled Web communities.
4 Discussion
Antisemitsm has been a historical harbinger of ethnic strife [6,
51]. While organizations have been tackling antisemitism and
its associated societal issues for decades, the rise and ubiqui-
tous nature of the Web has raised new concerns. Antisemitism
and hate have grown and proliferated rapidly online, and have
done so mostly unchecked. This is due, in large part, to the
scale and speed of the online world, and calls for new tech-
niques to better understand and combat this worrying behavior.
In this paper, we take the first step towards establishing a
large-scale, scientifically grounded, quantitative understanding
of antisemitism online. We analyze over 100M posts from July,
2016 to January, 2018 from two of the largest fringe commu-
nities on the Web: 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/)
and Gab (a Twitter-esque service). We find evidence of in-
creasing antisemitism and the use of racially charged language,
in large part correlating with real-world political events like
the 2016 US Presidential Election. We then analyze the con-
text this language is used in via word2vec, and discover sev-
eral distinct facets of antisemitic language, ranging from slurs
to conspiracy theories grounded in biblical literature. Finally,
we examine the prevalence and propagation of the antisemitic
“Happy Merchant” meme, finding that 4chan’s /pol/ and Red-
dit’s The Donald are the most influential and efficient, respec-
tively, in spreading this antisemitic meme across the Web.
We are certainly not the first to study antisemitism on-
line. However, our approach differs substantially from the one
traditionally taken by organizations like the Anti-Defamation
League in several important ways. First, we eschew the use of
surveys and qualitative analysis in favor of large-scale, data-
driven, reproducible measurement. Second, our work builds
upon the scientific literature resulting in well understood and
open methodology. Third, the toolkit we present provides a
clear direction for building automated, scalable, real-time sys-
tems to track and understand antisemitism and how it evolves
over time.
That said, our work is not without limitations. First, most of
our results should be considered a lower bound on the use of
antisemitic language and imagery. In particular, we note that
our quantification of the use of the “Happy Merchant” meme
is extremely conservative. The meme processing pipeline we
use is tuned in such a way that many Happy Merchant vari-
ants are clustered along with their “parent” meme. Second, our
quantification of the growth antisemitic language is focused
on two particular keywords, although we also show how new
rhetoric is discoverable. Third, we focus primarily on two spe-
cific fringe communities. As a new community, Gab in par-
ticular is still rapidly evolving, and so treating it as a stable
community (e.g., Hawkes processes), may cause us to under-
estimate its influence.
Regardless, there are several important recommendations
we can draw from our results. First, organizations such as
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the ADL and SPLC should refocus their efforts towards open,
data-driven methods. Small-scale, qualitative understanding is
still incredibly important, especially with regard to understand-
ing offline behavior. However, resources must be devoted to
scientifically valid large-scale data analysis. More importantly,
there is a need for greater transparency both in data (and its col-
lection process) and the methods used for analysis. The scale
of the problem of online hate has surpassed the ability of a
single organization to solve on its own. Instead, we argue that
traditional anti-hate organizations should form more intimate
relationships with scientists, not just allowing, but encourag-
ing peer-reviewed and open contributions to the scientific liter-
ature, in addition to their traditional modus operandi of public
education.
Second, we believe that–regardless of the participation of
anti-hate organizations–scientists, and particularly computer
scientists, must expend effort at understanding, measuring, and
combating online antisemitism and online hate in general. The
Web has changed the world in ways that were unimaginable
even ten years ago. The world has shrunk, and the Informa-
tion Age is in full effect. Unfortunately, many of the innova-
tions that make the world what it is today were created with
little thought to their negative consequences. For a long time,
technology innovators have not considered potential negative
impacts of the services they create, in some ways abdicating
their responsibility to society. The present work provides solid
quantified evidence that the technology that has had incredi-
bly positive results for society is being co-opted by actors that
have harnessed it in worrying ways, using the same concepts
of scale, speed, and network effects to greatly expand their in-
fluence and effects on the rest of the Web and the world at
large.
5 Materials and Methods
5.1 Datasets
To study the extent of antisemitism on the Web, we collect
two large-scale datasets from /pol/ and Gab. In this section,
we shall provide a brief overview for the two communities and
discuss our datasets. Table 6 summarizes the obtained datasets
for both Web communities.
/pol/. 4chan is an anonymous image board that is usually ex-
ploited by troll users. A user can create a new thread by creat-
ing a post that contains an image. Other users can reply below
with or without images and possibly add references to previ-
ous posts. 4chan is well-known for two features: anonymity
and ephemerality. The former is the main reason that its users
are more aggressive in their posts, as there is lack of account-
ability [16].The latter is an interesting feature as 4chan threads
usually get archived quickly (within the same day of their cre-
ation) and after one week they are permanently deleted. In this
work, we focus on the Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) as it
exhibits a high degree of racism and hate speech [49] and it is
an influential actor on the Web’s information ecosystem [112].
To obtain data from /pol/ posts we use the same crawling in-
frastructure as discussed in [49], while for the images we use
Platform /pol/ Gab
# of posts 67,416,903 35,528,320
# of images 5,859,439 1,125,154
Table 6: Overview of our datasets. We report the number of posts and
images from /pol/ and Gab.
the methodology discussed in [111]. Specifically, we obtain
posts and images posted between July 2016 and January 2018,
hence acquiring 67M posts and 5.8M images.
Gab. Gab is a newly created social network, founded in Au-
gust 2016, that explicitly welcomes banned users from other
communities (e.g., Twitter). It waves the flag of free speech
and it has mild moderation; it allows everything except ille-
gal pornography, posts that promote terrorist acts, and doxing
other users. Gab is inspired by both Twitter and Reddit in its
structure. Specifically, a user can share 300-character messages
with his followers (akin to Twitter), while popularity of posts
within the platform is dictated via a voting system (akin to
Reddit). To obtain data from Gab, we use the same method-
ology as described in [110] and [111] for posts and images,
respectively. Overall, we obtain 35M posts and 1.1M images
posted between August 2016 and January 2018.
Ethical Considerations. During this work, we only collect
publicly available data posted on /pol/ and Gab. We make no
attempt to de-anonymize users and we keep the collected data
in encrypted format. Overall, we follow best ethical practises
as documented in [85].
5.2 Changepoint Analysis
To perform the changepoint analysis, we use the PELT algo-
rithm as described in [53], and first applied to Gab timeseries
data in [110]. We model each timeseries as a set of samples
drawn from a normal distribution with mean and variance that
are free to change at discrete times. We expect from the central
limit theorem that for networks with large numbers of posts
and actors, that this is a reasonable model. The algorithm then
seeks to determine the points in time at which the mean and
variance change by maximizing the likelihood of the distribu-
tion given the data, subject to a penalty to avoid the prolifera-
tion of changepoints. We run the algorithm with a decreasing
set of penalty amplitudes. We keep track of the largest penalty
amplitude at which each changepoint first appears. This gives
us a ranking of the changepoints in order of their “signifi-
cance.”
5.3 Hawkes Processes
To assess the root cause of the appearance of Happy Mer-
chant memes on each of the communities, we leverage a
stochastic model known as a Hawkes Process. Generally, a
Hawkes model consists of K processes, where a process is
a sequence of events that happen with a particular probabil-
ity distribution. Colloquially, a process is analogous to a spe-
cific Web community where memes (i.e., events) are posted.
Each process has a rate of events, which defines expected fre-
quency of events on a specific Web community (for example,
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five posts with Happy Merchant memes per hour). An event
on one process can cause impulses on other processes, which
increase their rates for a period of time. An impulse is defined
by a weight and a probability distribution. The former dictates
the intensity of the impulse (i.e., how strong is the increase in
the rate of a process), while the latter dictates how the effect of
the impulse changes over time (typically it decays as time goes
on). For instance, a weight of 1.5 from process A to B, means
that each event on A will cause, on average, an additional 1.5
events on B.
In this work, we use a separate Hawkes model for each clus-
ter of images that we obtained when applying the pipeline re-
ported in [111]. Each model consists of five processes; one for
each of /pol/, The Donald, the rest of Reddit, Gab, and Twit-
ter. We elected to separate The Donald from the rest of Reddit,
as it is an influential actor with respect to the dissemination of
memes [111] Next, we fit each model using Gibbs sampling
as reported in [66, 67], as well as our previous research [111].
This technique enable us to obtain, at a given time, the weights
and probability distributions for each impulse that is active,
hence allowing us to be confident that an event is caused be-
cause of a previously occurred event on the same or on another
process.
Due to the aforementioned, we argue that Hawkes Processes
are a suitable framework for assessing the causal relationships
between events; hence we make use of them in this work in or-
der to quantify and understand the influence that Web commu-
nities have on each other with respect to the antisemitic Happy
Merchant meme.
Acknowledgments. Savvas Zannettou received funding from
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation
program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie ENCASE project
(Grant Agreement No. 691025). We also gratefully acknowl-
edge the support of the NVIDIA Corporation, for the donation
of the two Titan Xp GPUs used for our experiments.
References
[1] Ego Networks. http://www.analytictech.com/networks/egonet.
htm.
[2] T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, R. N. San-
ford, et al. The authoritarian personality. 1950.
[3] A. Alietti, D. Padovan, and L. E. Lungo. Religious Racism.
Islamophobia and Antisemitism in Italian Society. 2013.
[4] Anti-Defamation League. Alt Right: A Primer about the New
White Supremacy, 2017.
[5] Anti-Defamation League. ADL H.E.A.T. Map. https://www.
adl.org/heat-map, 2018.
[6] Anti-Defamation League. Anti-Semitism, 2018.
[7] Anti-Defamation League. Quantifying Hate: A Year of
Anti-Semitism on Twitter. https://www.adl.org/resources/
reports/quantifying-hate-a-year-of-anti-semitism-on-
twitter#methodology, 2018.
[8] Anti-Defamation League. White Supremacist Propaganda
Surges on Campus. https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/
white-supremacist-propaganda-surges-on-campus, 2018.
[9] M. Apuzzo. Muellers Prosecutors Are Said to
Have Interviewed Jared Kushner on Russia Meeting.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/us/politics/mueller-
jared-kushner-russia.html, 2017.
[10] H. Arendt. The origins of totalitarianism, volume 244.
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.
[11] P. Badjatiya, S. Gupta, M. Gupta, and V. Varma. Deep Learning
for Hate Speech Detection in Tweets. In WWW, 2017.
[12] BBC. Nice attack: At least 84 killed by lorry at Bastille
Day celebrations. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
36800730, 2016.
[13] BBC. Trump travel ban comes into effect for six coun-
tries. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40452360,
2017.
[14] BBC Press. Jerusalem shooting: Two killed by Pales-
tinian gunman. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-37600221, 2016.
[15] D. Ben-Moshe and A. Halafoff. Antisemitism and Jewish Chil-
dren and Youth in Australias Capital Territory Schools. 2014.
[16] M. S. Bernstein, A. Monroy-Herna´ndez, D. Harry, P. Andre´,
K. Panovich, and G. G. Vargas. 4chan and/b: An Analysis of
Anonymity and Ephemerality in a Large Online Community.
In ICWSM, 2011.
[17] D. Bilefsky. London Attack Near Mosque Investigated as Ter-
rorism. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/europe/
uk-van-attack-london-mosque.html, 2017.
[18] M. Bilewicz, M. Winiewski, M. Kofta, and A. Wo´jcik. Harm-
ful Ideas, The Structure and Consequences of Anti-S emitic
Beliefs in Poland. Political Psychology, 34(6):821–839, 2013.
[19] V. D. Blondel, J.-L. Guillaume, R. Lambiotte, and E. Lefeb-
vre. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks.
Journal of statistical mechanics: theory and experiment,
2008(10):P10008, 2008.
[20] S. Boyce. Hundreds of Anti-Trump Protesters Rally in
Downtown L.A. as 1-Year Anniversary of His Election Nears.
https://ktla.com/2017/11/04/anti-trump-protest-scheduled-
for-downtown-l-a-other-major-cities-nationwide/, 2017.
[21] D. Boyer and S. Miller. Trump meets Netanyahu in New
York, says there’s ’good chance’ for Middle East peace.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/18/donald-
trump-meets-benjamin-netanyahu-new-york-say/, 2017.
[22] P.-E. Buet, E. Mclaughlin, and J. Masters. Ne-
tanyahu: Paris peace conference is ’useless’. https:
//www.cnn.com/2017/01/15/middleeast/paris-peace-
conference-israeli-palestinian-conflict/index.html, 2017.
[23] G. F. Burch, J. H. Batchelor, J. J. Burch, S. Gibson, and
B. Kimball. Microaggression, anxiety, trigger warnings, emo-
tional reasoning, mental filtering, and intellectual homogeneity
on campus: A study of what students think. Journal of Educa-
tion for Business, 93(5):233–241, 2018.
[24] P. Burnap and M. L. Williams. Us and them: identifying cyber
hate on Twitter across multiple protected characteristics. EPJ
Data Science, 5:1–15, 2016.
[25] Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism. Re-
port to the Nation: Hate Crime Rise in U.S. Cities and
U.S. Counties in Time of Division and Foreign Inter-
ference. https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb csbs/files/2018%
20Hate%20Final%20Report%205-14.pdf, 2018.
[26] J. Chen. Beastie Boys Adam Yauch Memorial Park
Vandalized With Swastikas, Trump Graffiti in Brooklyn.
12
https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/beastie-
boys-memorial-park-vandalized-with-swastikas-trump-
graffiti-w451523/, 2016.
[27] CNN. presidential results. https://www.cnn.com/election/
2016/results/president, 2016.
[28] S. Collinson. Donald Trump accepts presidential nomi-
nation. https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/21/politics/republican-
convention-highlights-day-four/index.html, 2016.
[29] R. Costa and A. Phillip. Stephen Bannon removed from
National Security Council. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/04/05/steven-bannon-no-longer-
a-member-of-national-security-council/, 2016.
[30] C. Dan. In Ingural Address, Trump Pledges to Keep ’America
First’. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/inauguration-
2017/inaugural-address-trump-pledges-message-america-
first-n709691, 2017.
[31] T. J. Davidson, D. Warmsley, M. W. Macy, and I. Weber. Au-
tomated Hate Speech Detection and the Problem of Offensive
Language. In ICWSM, 2017.
[32] J. Diamond, K. Collins, and E. Landers. Trump’s chief strate-
gist Steve Bannon fired. https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/18/
politics/steve-bannon-white-house/index.html, 2017.
[33] N. Djuric, J. Zhou, R. Morris, M. Grbovic, V. Radosavljevic,
and N. Bhamidipati. Hate Speech Detection with Comment
Embeddings. In WWW, 2015.
[34] E. Dunbar and L. Simonova. Individual difference and social
status predictors of anti-Semitism and racism US and Czech
findings with the prejudice/tolerance and right wing authoritar-
ianism scales. International Journal of Intercultural Relations,
27(5):507–523, 2003.
[35] R. Ellis and R. Flores. Multiple officers killed at Dallas
protest over police killings. https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/
us/philando-castile-alton-sterling-reaction/index.html.
[36] M. ElSherief, V. Kulkarni, D. Nguyen, W. Y. Wang, and E. M.
Belding-Royer. Hate Lingo: A Target-based Linguistic Analy-
sis of Hate Speech in Social Media. In ICWSM, 2018.
[37] M. ElSherief, S. Nilizadeh, D. Nguyen, G. Vigna, and E. M.
Belding-Royer. Peer to Peer Hate: Hate Speech Instigators and
Their Targets. In ICWSM, 2018.
[38] A. Enotus. Secret CIA assessment says Russia
was trying to help Trump win White House. https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-
orders-review-of-russian-hacking-during-presidential-
campaign/2016/12/09/31d6b300-be2a-11e6-94ac-
3d324840106c story.html?utm term=.f6d439f89ea8, 2017.
[39] M. Ester, H.-P. Kriegel, J. Sander, X. Xu, et al. A density-based
algorithm for discovering clusters in large spatial databases
with noise. In KDD, 1996.
[40] C. Flores-Saviaga, B. C. Keegan, and S. Savage. Mobilizing
the Trump Train: Understanding Collective Action in a Politi-
cal Trolling Community. In ICWSM, 2018.
[41] A.-M. Founta, D. Chatzakou, N. Kourtellis, J. Blackburn,
A. Vakali, and I. Leontiadis. A Unified Deep Learning Archi-
tecture for Abuse Detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00385,
2018.
[42] N. Francis. Reddit’s The Donald Was One Of The Biggest
Havens For Russian Propaganda During 2016 Election,
Analysis Finds. https://www.inquisitr.com/4790689/reddits-
the donald-was-one-of-the-biggest-havens-for-russian-
propaganda-during-2016-election-analysis-finds/, 2018.
[43] W. Frindte, S. Wettig, and D. Wammetsberger. Old and new
anti-Semitic attitudes in the context of authoritarianism and so-
cial dominance orientationTwo studies in Germany. Peace and
Conflict, 11(3):239–266, 2005.
[44] L. Gao and R. Huang. Detecting Online Hate Speech Using
Context Aware Models. In RANLP, 2017.
[45] L. Gao, A. Kuppersmith, and R. Huang. Recognizing Explicit
and Implicit Hate Speech Using a Weakly Supervised Two-
path Bootstrapping Approach. In IJCNLP, 2017.
[46] N. D. Gitari, Z. Zuping, H. Damien, and J. Long. A
Lexicon-based Approach for Hate Speech Detection. Inter-
national Journal of Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering,
10(4):215–230, 2015.
[47] A. G. Hawkes. Spectra of some self-exciting and mutually
exciting point processes. Biometrika, 58(1):83–90, 1971.
[48] W. Hennigan. Trump Orders Strikes on Syria Over Chemi-
cal Weapons. http://time.com/5240164/syria-missile-strikes-
donald-trump-chemical-weapons/, 2017.
[49] G. E. Hine, J. Onaolapo, E. De Cristofaro, N. Kourtellis,
I. Leontiadis, R. Samaras, G. Stringhini, and J. Blackburn.
Kek, Cucks, and God Emperor Trump: A Measurement Study
of 4chan’s Politically Incorrect Forum and Its Effects on the
Web. In ICWSM, 2017.
[50] J. Hirschfeld. Trump Orders Mexican Border Wall
to Be Built and Plans to Block Syrian Refugees.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/refugees-
immigrants-wall-trump.html, 2017.
[51] History. Anti-Semitism, 2018.
[52] M. Jacomy, T. Venturini, S. Heymann, and M. Bastian.
ForceAtlas2, a continuous graph layout algorithm for handy
network visualization designed for the Gephi software. PloS
one, 9(6):e98679, 2014.
[53] R. Killick, P. Fearnhead, and I. A. Eckley. Optimal detection of
changepoints with a linear computational cost. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 107(500):1590–1598, 2012.
[54] Know Your Meme. Know Your Meme Site. http://
knowyourmeme.com/.
[55] Know Your Meme. Bait / This is Bait Meme. https://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/bait-this-is-bait, 2018.
[56] Know Your Meme. Feels Good Meme. https://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/feels-good, 2018.
[57] Know Your Meme. Good Goy. https://knowyourmeme.com/
photos/1373391-happy-merchant, 2018.
[58] Know Your Meme. Happy Merchant Meme. http://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant, 2018.
[59] Know Your Meme. Pepe the Frog Meme. http://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/pepe-the-frog, 2018.
[60] Know Your Meme. Roll Safe Meme. http://knowyourmeme.
com/memes/roll-safe, 2018.
[61] Know Your Meme. The Goyim Know. https://knowyourmeme.
com/memes/the-goyim-know-shut-it-down, 2018.
[62] I. Kwok and Y. Wang. Locate the Hate: Detecting Tweets
against Blacks. In AAAI, 2013.
[63] L. Leets. Experiencing hate speech: Perceptions and responses
to anti-semitism and antigay speech. Journal of social issues,
58(2):341–361, 2002.
[64] J. Lemire. Trump blames ’many sides’ after vi-
olent white supremacist rally in Virginia. http:
//www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-
13
trump-charlottesville-violence-20170812-story.html, 2017.
[65] D. Levine and L. Hurley. Another U.S. appeals court refuses to
revive Trump travel ban. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-immigration-ruling-court/another-u-s-appeals-court-
refuses-to-revive-trump-travel-ban-idUSKBN19321K, 2017.
[66] S. W. Linderman and R. P. Adams. Discovering Latent Net-
work Structure in Point Process Data. In ICML, 2014.
[67] S. W. Linderman and R. P. Adams. Scalable Bayesian
Inference for Excitatory Point Process Networks. ArXiv
1507.03228, 2015.
[68] R. Magu, K. Joshi, and J. Luo. Detecting the Hate Code on
Social Media. In ICWSM, 2017.
[69] A. Marwick and R. Lewis. Media manipulation and disinfor-
mation online. New York: Data & Society Research Institute,
2017.
[70] N. McCaskill, A. Isensadt, and S. Goldmacher. Paul
Manafort resigns from Trump campaign. https:
//www.politico.com/story/2016/08/paul-manafort-resigns-
from-trump-campaign-227197, 2016.
[71] T. Mikolov, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean. Efficient esti-
mation of word representations in vector space. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1301.3781, 2013.
[72] M. Mondal, L. A. Silva, and F. Benevenuto. A Measurement
Study of Hate Speech in Social Media. In HT, 2017.
[73] V. Monga and B. L. Evans. Perceptual image hashing via fea-
ture points: performance evaluation and tradeoffs. IEEE Trans-
actions on Image Processing, 15(11):3452–3465, 2006.
[74] J. Moore. US officials warned Israel not to share sensitive ma-
terial with Trump. https://www.newsweek.com/us-officials-
warned-israel-not-share-sensitive-intel-trump-609782, 2017.
[75] C. Morello and R. Eglash. U.S. declines to veto U.N. Security
Council resolution for Israel to stop Jewish settlement activity.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-
declines-to-veto-un-security-council-resolution-for-israel-to-
stop-jewish-settlement-activity/2016/12/23/cd4efe72-c939-
11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf story.html, 2016.
[76] F. Morstatter, Y. Shao, A. Galstyan, and S. Karunasekera. From
Alt-Right to Alt-Rechts: Twitter Analysis of the 2017 German
Federal Election. In WWW Companion, 2018.
[77] K. Mu¨ller and C. Schwarz. Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social
Media and Hate Crime. 2017.
[78] K. Mu¨ller and C. Schwarz. Making America Hate Again?
Twitter and Hate Crime under Trump. 2018.
[79] C. Naughton. Live fact checking the senate intelligence
committee hearing with attorney general jeff sessions. http:
//www.kuer.org/post/live-fact-checking-senate-intelligence-
committee-hearing-attorney-general-jeff-sessions#stream/0,
2017.
[80] A. Olteanu, K. Talamadupula, and K. R. Varshney. The Lim-
its of Abstract Evaluation Metrics: The Case of Hate Speech
Detection. In WebSci, 2017.
[81] A. Parker. McMaster: Trumps sharing of sensi-
tive intelligence with Russia was wholly appropri-
ate’. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/05/16/trump-acknowledges-facts-shared-
with-russian-envoys-during-white-house-meeting/, 2017.
[82] F. Pleitgen, A. Dewan, J. Griffiths, and C. Schoichet. Berlin
attack: ISIS claims it inspired truck assault at market.
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/20/europe/berlin-christmas-
market-truck/index.html, 2016.
[83] Politico. Full transcript: Second 2016 presidential debate.
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/2016-presidential-
debate-transcript-229519, 2016.
[84] H. Przybyla and F. Schouten. At 2.6 million strong, Women’s
Marches crush expectations. https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2017/01/21/womens-march-aims-start-
movement-trump-inauguration/96864158/, 2017.
[85] C. M. Rivers and B. L. Lewis. Ethical research standards in a
world of big data. F1000Research, 3, 2014.
[86] B. Ross, M. Rist, G. Carbonell, B. Cabrera, N. Kurowsky, and
M. Wojatzki. Measuring the Reliability of Hate Speech An-
notations: The Case of the European Refugee Crisis. Arxiv,
abs/1701.08118, 2017.
[87] H. M. Saleem, K. P. Dillon, S. Benesch, and D. Ruths. A
Web of Hate: Tackling Hateful Speech in Online Social Spaces.
CoRR, abs/1709.10159, 2017.
[88] S. Schama. (((SEMITISM))) Being Jewish in America in the
Age of Trump, 2018.
[89] J. Serra, I. Leontiadis, D. Spathis, G. Stringhini, J. Blackburn,
and A. Vakali. Class-based Prediction Errors to Detect Hate
Speech with Out-of-vocabulary Words. 2017.
[90] M. Shainkman, L. Dencik, and K. Marosi. Different Anti-
semitisms: on Three Distinct Forms of Antisemitism in Con-
temporary Europe with a Special Focus on Sweden. 2016.
[91] M. Shear. Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate
Agreement. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html, 2017.
[92] M. Shear, C. Savage, and M. Haberman. Trump
Attacks Rosenstein in Latest Rebuke of Justice De-
partment. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/politics/
trump-investigation-comey-russia.html, 2017.
[93] L. A. Silva, M. Mondal, D. Correa, F. Benevenuto, and I. We-
ber. Analyzing the Targets of Hate in Online Social Media. In
ICWSM, 2016.
[94] T. D. Smedt, G. D. Pauw, and P. V. Ostaeyen. Automatic Detec-
tion of Online Jihadist Hate Speech. CoRR, abs/1803.04596,
2018.
[95] Southern Poverty Law Center. The Year in Hate and Ex-
tremism. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2018/2017-year-hate-and-extremism, 2017.
[96] Southern Poverty Law Center. SPLC Hate Map. https://www.
splcenter.org/hate-map, 2018.
[97] H. Spencer and C. Scholberg. White Nationalists March on
University of Virginia. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/
us/white-nationalists-rally-charlottesville-virginia.html, 2017.
[98] SPLC. ALT-RIGHT. 2017.
[99] G. Staff. Four arrested over Facebook Live video
of man tortured amid anti-Trump taunts. https:
//www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/04/facebook-
live-stream-video-man-attacked-chicago-trump, 2017.
[100] P. staff. Full text: James Comey statement to
Senate intelligence committee on Trump contact.
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/07/james-comey-
trump-russia-testimony-2017-239253, 2017.
[101] C. R. Sunstein. Republic: Divided democracy in the age of
social media. Princeton University Press, 2018.
[102] A. Thompson. The Measure of Hate on 4Chan.
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-
measure-of-hate-on-4chan-627922/, 2018.
14
[103] Urban Dictionary. Huwhite. https://www.urbandictionary.
com/define.php?term=Huwhite, 2017.
[104] F. D. Vigna, A. Cimino, F. Dell’Orletta, M. Petrocchi, and
M. Tesconi. Hate Me, Hate Me Not: Hate Speech Detection
on Facebook. In ITASEC, 2017.
[105] W. Warner and J. Hirschberg. Detecting Hate Speech on the
World Wide Web. In Proceedings of the Second Workshop on
Language in Social Media, 2012.
[106] Z. Waseem and D. Hovy. Hateful Symbols or Hateful People?
Predictive Features for Hate Speech Detection on Twitter. In
HLT-NAACL, 2016.
[107] Wikipedia. Goy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goy, 2018.
[108] R. Wolf and A. Gomez. Supreme Court reinstates Trump’s
travel ban, but only for some immigrants. https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/26/supreme-court-
reinstates-president-trumps-travel-ban/103134132/, 2017.
[109] S. Zannettou, J. Blackburn, E. De Cristofaro, M. Sirivianos,
and G. Stringhini. Understanding Web Archiving Services and
Their (Mis) Use on Social Media. In ICWSM, 2018.
[110] S. Zannettou, B. Bradlyn, E. De Cristofaro, H. Kwak, M. Siri-
vianos, G. Stringini, and J. Blackburn. What is Gab: A Bastion
of Free Speech or an Alt-Right Echo Chamber. In WWW Com-
panion, 2018.
[111] S. Zannettou, T. Caulfield, J. Blackburn, E. De Cristofaro,
M. Sirivianos, G. Stringhini, and G. Suarez-Tangil. On the
Origins of Memes by Means of Fringe Web Communities. In
IMC, 2018.
[112] S. Zannettou, T. Caulfield, E. De Cristofaro, N. Kourtellis,
I. Leontiadis, M. Sirivianos, G. Stringhini, and J. Blackburn.
The Web Centipede: Understanding How Web Communities
Influence Each Other Through the Lens of Mainstream and Al-
ternative News Sources. In IMC, 2017.
A Supporting Information
This appendix includes supplementary figures and tables referenced
throughout the rest of the paper.
15
supremac
scribe koran
shitskin
ancestri
tribalist
pogrom
mosh
monolith
faith
racialist
pharise
bloodlin
hama
arab
sect
shalom
waronwhit
bibi
itsthejew
qur
namethejew
judea
holodomor
zio
hitlerwasright
iran
collectivist
biblic
zionism
judaism
(((peopl)))
theologian
scofield
lapdog
tribal
theolog
cosmopolitan
church
netanyahu
bolshev
persecut
galatian
humanist
ot
spic
greasinationalsocialist
israel
diaspora
heresi
athiest
chabad
goi
kike
racemix
internationalist
nazi
anathema
talmud
supremacist
churc ian
heeb
israhel
orthodoxi
subvers
joo
schtick
judean
chosen
knesset
khazar
hegemoni
shiksa
hasbarat
mormon
jerusalem
agnost
kurd
firster
jewri
leviticu
babylonian
cohencid
doctrin
khazarian
messian
jew
hitler
whiteprid
individualist
religi
semit
kabbalah
assyrian
atheist
whitegenocid
ashkenazi
lebanon
universalist
lineag
pagan
sanhedrin
jewsa
settler
surnam
chutzpah
admixtur
sephard
jewish
newworldord
abrahamishmael
sandnigg
genozid
apost
ideolog
mongrel(((thei)))
arabl
piou
marxism
phenotyp
mideast
torah
hinduism
yhwh
marx
superstiti
ewig
virul
(((jew)))
@shimrat
(((who)))
fascism
european
nazareth
globalist
fundamentalist
tenet
heathen
palestin
judaic
stalin
islam
asiat
plo
palestinian
heret
apologetisraelit
antithet
dogma
trotski
hebrew
antisemit
isra
semet
tribe
theologi
zog
quran
yiddish
neocon
tradit
hindu
atheism
schlomo
shekel
bibl
vers
philistin
apostasi
kikeri
evangel
shlomo
yid
christian
rabbin
scriptur
buddhismgentil
bigot
islamophob
usuri
nigger
xtian
judah
sicilian
nazism
rootless
gnostic
isreal
coptic
juden
christ
faggot
(((them)))
whitenation
protestant
gtkrwn
shabbat
jidf
jdisch
genet
bigotri
sumerian
edomit
behest
@donaldfox
esau
ethiopian
filthi
freemasonri
devout
mose
religion
stalinist
jewi
judeo
bolshevik
zionist
orthodox
(((their)))
christendom
metruth
messiah
syria
kvetch
lenin
ethnic
middleeast
synagogu
ethnocentr
begon
nt
warmong
goyim
neanderth
golem
buddhist
canaanit
rabbi
secular
catholic
jewess
hadith
communist
hasbara
faggit
proselyt
cocksuck
supremaci
yahweh
cathol
idolatri
thegoyimknow
ussr
nationalsoci
alli
apostol evangelist
(((globalist)))
thanksjew
aipac
shabbo
dna
Figure 11: Graph representation of the words associated with “jew” on Gab. We extract the graph by finding the most similar words ( cutoff
at 0.4 cosine distance value) and then we take the 2-hop ego network around “jew. In this graph the size of a node is proportional to its degree
(i.e., the number of other nodes it is directly connected to); the color of a node is based on the community it is a member of; and the entire graph
is visualized using a layout algorithm that takes edge weights into account (i.e., nodes with similar words will be closer in the visualization).
Note that the figure is best viewed in color.
Rank Date Events
1 2016-08-23 2016-08-19: Paul Manafort resigns as chairman of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign [70].
2
5
9
2016-12-22
2016-12-18
2016-12-24
2016-12-23: Samantha Power, US ambassador to the UN abstains from voting in a
140 Security Council vote to condemn Israel’s construction of settlements into the Palestinian territories [75].
2016-12-19: ISIS truck attack in Berlin Germany [82].
3
7
2017-08-16
2017-08-17
2017-08-12: The “Unite the Right” rally takes place in Charlottesville, Virginia [97].
2017-08-13: President Trump, in a press briefing, condemns the violence from “many sides”
at a far-right rally at Charlottesville, Virginia [64].
4
8
2016-11-15
2016-11-22
2016-11-08: Presidential election of Donald Trump [27].
2016-11-19: Swastikas, Trump Graffiti appear in Beastie Boys Adam Yauch Memorial Park in Brooklyn [26]..
6 2017-07-18
2017-07-18: In bilateral meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
President Trump addresses a potential peace deal for the Israel Palestine conflict,
and discusses Iranian incursions in the region [21].
10 2017-01-01 -
Table 7: Dates that significant changepoint were detected in posts that contain the term “jew” on Gab. We sort them according to their
“significance” (see Section 5) and we report corresponding real-world events that happened one week before/after of the changepoint date.
16
Rank Date Events
1
5
2016-12-06
2016-12-04
2016-12-09: According to the Washington Post, The US Central Intelligence Agency
has concluded that Russia actively assisted Donald Trump to win the 2016 election [38].
2 2017-01-08
2017-01-04: Four African Americans stream a video on Facebook torturing
a white man with a mental disorder. Chicago Police arrest the suspects and all
four face hate crime charges [99].
3 2017-08-12
2017-08-12: The “Unite the Right” rally takes place in Charlottesville, Virginia [97].
2017-08-13: President Trump, in a press briefing, condemns the violence from “many sides”
at a far-right rally at Charlottesville, Virginia [64].
4 2017-11-08
2017-11-04: Protests held by “Refuse Fascism” an anti-Trump organization,
take place in New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco [20].
6
9
2016-12-26
2016-12-20 2016-12-19: ISIS truck attack in Berlin Germany [82]
7 2016-08-18 -
8 2016-11-10 2016-11-08: Presidential election of Donald Trump [27].
10 2017-06-02
2017-06-01: The United States withdraws from the Paris Climate Agreement [91].
2017-06-03: London van attack committed by ISIS [17].
Table 8: Dates that significant changepoint were detected in posts that contain the term “white” on Gab. We sort them according to their
“significance” (see Section 5) and we report corresponding real-world events that happened one week before/after of the changepoint date.
17
whitenation
hispan
whitepeopl
disenfranchis
colonist
minor
irish
racism
shitskin
latino
whitelivesmatt
darki
afrikan
underclass
white
european
racist
nonwhit
huwhit
black
negroid
aborigin
colonis
dispossess
genocid
african
ethnost
stopwhitegenocid
waronwhit
displac
whiteprid
whitei
demograph
itsokaytobewhit
asiat
nativ
ethnic
antiwhit
itsoktobewhit
blacki
caucasian
ethnocentr
predominantli
whiteprivileg
whitegenocid
briton
race
privileg
predomin
mestizo
settler
afro
admixtur
indigen
negro
celt
aryan
asian
hapa
fashi
poc
colon
thanksjew
coloni
Figure 12: Graph representation of the words associated with “white”
on Gab. We generate the graph using the same procedure as Fig. 5.
Note that the figure is best viewed in color.
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Figure 13: Percentage of daily posts per day for the terms “jew” and
“white” on Gab. We also report the detected changepoints (see Ta-
bles 7 and 8, respectively, for the meaning of each changepoint).
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